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Among the thirteen original colonies, Pennsylvania was most successful at issuing paper money with
only minimal effects on prices -- so much so that the colony's experience is sometimes seen as violating
the classical quantity theory of money. Quantity theorists usually attribute this apparent anomaly to
mismeasurement of the money stock. In contrast, I use data on money, prices, and real activity in Pennsylvania
from 1723 to 1774 and for the United States as a whole from 1790 to 1850 (when the money stock
is better measured) to show that the long-run behavior of money and prices is well explained by the
quantity theory in both periods, despite the differences in institutional arrangements, once growth in










Backing, the Quantity Theory, and the Transition to the U.S. Dollar, 1723-1850 
 




Prior to the ratification of the Federal Constitution and adoption of the dollar standard 
nationwide, the thirteen original colonies operated under monetary systems that differed 
significantly from the one that followed. Among these, Pennsylvania was most successful at 
issuing paper money with only minimal effects on prices -- so much so that the colony’s 
experience is sometimes seen as violating the classical quantity theory of money, that is, the 
identity 
( 1 )   M V   =   P Y ,             
 
where M is the nominal money stock, V its velocity, P the price level, and Y real monetized 
transactions. Quantity theorists generally focus on the left-hand side of (1) when dismissing this 
apparent anomaly as resulting from mismeasurement of M (Ronald Michener, 1987; Bennett T. 
McCallum, 1992). In contrast, this study emphasizes the right-hand side in faulting the 
assumption of a constant Y.  Specifically, I use data on money, prices, and real activity in 
Pennsylvania from 1723 to 1774 and for the nation as a whole from 1790 to 1850 (when M is 
better measured) to show that the long-run behavior of money and prices is well explained by (1) 
in both periods despite the differences in institutional arrangements.  
The analysis is in the spirit of Robert E. Lucas (1980), who controlled for short-run 
effects while isolating the relationship between money and prices in postwar U.S. data, but 
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differs in bringing the effects of a growing modern sector back into the empirics at a time when 
accounting for them is crucial. How Pennsylvania money held its value in the short term is 
another matter, but I observe that the “backing” theory (Bruce D. Smith, 1985) seems ready to 
explain the data without requiring large stocks and flows of circulating specie money. My view 
thus offers some common ground among the quantity and backing theories.  
 
I.  Background 
Before the Revolutionary War, various foreign coins passed from hand to hand as 
currency, supplemented by assorted fiat paper monies issued by individual colonial legislatures 
that sometimes also passed current beyond their borders. There is disagreement about how 
important coins were to the total money supply, with estimates ranging from as little as one-fifth 
to as much as two-thirds of it on average. Though this means that the quantity theory cannot be 
tested for the colonies with the total money stock, scholars have still noted low correlations 
between prices and outstanding stocks of paper money. 
Indeed, assuming V and Y are constant in the short term, as per the usual starting point for 
the quantity theorists, Roger C. West (1978) found no statistical relationship between paper 
money and prices with the available data for the colonies of New York, Pennsylvania, and South 
Carolina. Michener (pp. 236-7) observed the absence of specie in the money stock of West’s 
regressions and reasoned that if this potentially large component were included and were to 
fluctuate so as to offset paper money issues and retirements, the quantity theory would still hold. 
I contend that new paper issues, rather than causing perfectly offsetting specie outflows, could 
have been absorbed without inflation in so far as they encouraged more transactions (i.e., Y) to   3
be made using money. Since money was more efficient than barter or bookkeeping, its issuance 
not only drew transactions into the formal economy, but may have also increased activity therein.  
The colonial economy certainly grew intensively over the period studied. John J. 
McCusker’s essay in the Historical Statistics of the United States (Susan B. Carter et al., 2006, 
Vol. 5, pp. 630-31) suggests average annual per capita income growth of 0.6 percent between 
1655 and 1775, with more rapid growth between 1740 and 1774. But even these estimates, 
though substantial by the standards of the time, understate how much the modern sector grew. 
For example, Pennsylvania’s real exports to and total trade with England increased at average 
annual rates of 16.8 and 16.7 percent, respectively, between 1723 and 1774. Per capita output 
grew more quickly in the nation as a whole from 1790 to 1850, and real exports and total trade 
grew at average annual rates of 11.8 and 11.7 percent, respectively, despite the export embargo 
of 1807-09. This is why it is necessary to control for Y explicitly when exploring the relationship 
between money and prices in colonial and early U.S. history. To his credit, John Webbe (1743, p. 
6) seemed unconfused when he wrote that “the value of it (i.e., paper money) will, on a 
supposition of its quantity continuing the same, be more or less in proportion to the intrinsic 




The empirics proceed as follows: first, I show that traditional tests of the quantity theory 
“fail” for the United States as a whole between 1790 and 1850 in much the same way as they do 
for colonial Pennsylvania. This occurs even though we have much more complete data for the 
total money supply (i.e., paper and specie) for the later period and despite the absence of a 
system of government-issued fiat monies at that time. Then, assuming V constant, I proxy for Y 
using real exports and demonstrate that a long-run relationship, consistent with the quantity   4
theory, exists between Y and M/P in both periods. Since Y represents monetized transactions 
rather than aggregate output and such transactions were more prevalent in modern sectors such 
as shipping and international commerce than traditional ones, trends and fluctuations in real 
exports, even those associated with declining transport costs, would seem to provide the best 
available combined indicator of the demand for money and the economy’s ability to absorb it. 
 
Table 1—West-Style Regressions of Prices on Money 
            
   Philadelphia Prices 1723-1774           U.S. Prices 1790-1850 
            
Constant       4.235
**  4.021
** 3.946
**     0.084     -0.318  -0.554 
 (0.409)  (0.549)  (0.621)   (0.262)  (0.396)  (0.483) 
M t  0.034 -0.052  -0.052    -0.009  0.007  -0.007 
   (0.035)  (0.047)  (0.053)    (0.049)  (0.050)  (0.056) 
M t-1     0.114
** 0.090        0.068  0.081 
     (0.036)  (0.060)       (0.051)  (0.052) 
M t-2     0.032        0.052 
     (0.038)        (0.056) 
Regression R
2  0.00  0.14 0.09    0.00  0.04 0.08 
            
Durbin-Watson 1.56 1.59 1.59    1.53 1.59  1.55 
Note: All variables are in log levels. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10 percent (*) 
and 5 percent (**) levels, respectively. Regression R
2s
 are from the transformed AR1 equations. 
 
Table 1 presents West-style regressions that correct for first order serial correlation via 
maximum likelihood.
1 For colonial Pennsylvania, I use annual averages of Arthur H. Cole’s 
(1938, Table 48, pp. 138-9) index of monthly wholesale commodity prices for Philadelphia and 
the stock of paper money from Historical Statistics (2006, Vol. 5, Series Eg307, pp. 692-3).  For 
1790-1850, I use the consumer price index from Historical Statistics (Vol.3, Series Cc2, p.158) 
and the total money stock from Rousseau and Richard Sylla (2005, p. 22-4). There is little 
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evidence of correlation between the logs of prices and either contemporaneous or lagged money 
in either period. The lack of support for the quantity theory for 1790-1850 offers reason for 
pause since the proper measurement of M renders the classical explanation for the failure of 
West’s regressions inapplicable to the early Federal period. Indeed, it even seems that the 
quantity theory is better supported in the data for colonial Pennsylvania (see col. 2 of Table 1), 
which excludes the specie component of the money stock.   
Maybe a short-run relation between money and prices that does not account for increases 
in monetized transactions or growth of the modern economy is just too much to expect from the 
quantity theory for 18th and early 19th century America. But does the quantity theory hold in the 
long-run?  If so, we might expect to find a cointegrating relation between Y and M/P after 
rearranging (1).  
Table 2 presents Soren Johansen’s trace and maximum eigenvalue (λ-max) statistics for 
the corresponding bivariate autoregressive systems with three lags as determined by nested 
likelihood ratio tests. For colonial Pennsylvania, I use real exports to England from Historical 
Statistics (Vol. 5, Series Eg432, pp. 710-11) to proxy for Y; for 1790-1850 I use total exports and 
re-exports of merchandise (Vol. 5, Series Ee365, pp. 498-9) deflated by the export price index 
(Vol. 5, Series Ee431, pp. 515-16). M/P is formed by dividing the series for outstanding bills of 
credit and the total money stock by the corresponding commodity price indices.
2 The test 
statistics reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration (r = 0) at the 10 percent level or better for 
both systems, while the null of at most one cointegrating vector (r ≤ 1) is not rejected for either. 
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This implies the existence of a valid error correction representation with a single cointegrating 
vector. Table 2 includes estimates of these vector error correction models (VECMs) of the form 
 
(2) ΔYt  =  μ1 + γ1,1ΔYt-1 + γ1,2ΔYt-2 + ξ 1,1ΔM/Pt-1 + ξ1,2ΔM/Pt-2 + α1(β1Yt-1 + β2M/Pt-1) + ε1,t 
 
(3) ΔM/Pt = μ2 + γ2,1ΔYt-1 + γ2,2ΔYt-2 + ξ 2,1ΔM/Pt-1 + ξ2,2ΔM/Pt-2 + α2(β1Yt-1 + β2M/Pt-1) + ε2,t, 
 
where β1 and β2  are loadings on Y and M/P that form a linear stationary combination (i.e., the 
“error correction term” or ECT) and the αi measure the speed with which the dependent variables 
adjust to shocks that perturb the combination. The ECT enters the model as a single lag. 
   
Table 2— Vector Error Correction Models 
  
          
  Pennsylvania   United  States 
  1723-1774   1790-1850 
Dependent variable:  Y t  M/P t   Y  t  M/P t 
Constant -0.255  0.213
**  0.822
** 0.060 
   (0.168)  (0.064)    (0.228)  (0.103) 
Y t-1  -0.274 -0.081    -0.024  0.033 
 (0.179)  (0.067)    (0.163)  (0.074) 
Y t-2  -0.140 -0.033   0.026  -0.064 
 (0.150)  (0.058)    (0.138)  (0.063) 
M/P t-1  -0.363 0.482
**   -0.064 -0.267
* 
 (0.375)  (0.128)    (0.329)  (0.149) 
M/P t-2  -0.347 0.065    -0.235  0.101 





 (0.137)  (0.052)    (0.169)  (0.077) 
Adj. R
2  0.18 0.27    0.26  0.08 
Durbin-Watson 1.84  2.04    1.91  1.98 
Cointegration Tests:          
Trace  r=0  15.46
**    13.10     
 
λ-max r=0  13.45
*       12.67
* 
r ≤ 1   2.01       0.43 
Loading  1, -0.950    1, -0.609 
Note: All variables are in log levels. Asterisks denote statistical 
significance at the 10 percent (*) and 5 percent (**) levels, respectively.   
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  For colonial Pennsylvania, the coefficients on the ECT (i.e., the αi’s) are significant at the 
five percent level in both equations of the VECM. The negative loading on the level of M/P in 
the cointegrating vector (see final row of Table 2), combined with negative sign on α in the Y 
equation implies that increases in M/P, which depressed the value of the stationary combination, 
were met with increases in Y. The α is positive in the M/P equation, which combined with the 
positive loading on Y suggests that increases in modern sector activity acted as an inducement for 
additional paper money issues. For 1790 to 1850, the ECT is negative and significant only in the 
Y equation. Combined with the negative loading on M/P, this once again suggests that increases 
in the real money stock tended to raise Y in the long-run. The short-run parameters (i.e., the γi’s 
and ζi’s) are generally not significant in either period, except for the first lag of M/P in the M/P 
equations, which might be expected given that the coefficients of first-order autocorrelation for 




The findings of Section II support the long-run implications of the quantity theory. At the 
same time, the insignificant short-run parameter estimates in the VECMs raise the question of 
why prices did not increase more on impact given the quantities of paper money sometimes 
issued. For 1790-1850 one can argue that paper money was issued by banks and that individuals 
could most of the time present it to the issuer for redemption in specie, meaning that the young 
nation operated under fixed specie-paper exchange rates defended by individual banks. But who 
would have defended fixed rates in colonial Pennsylvania? Michener (p. 264) suggests that it 
was Philadelphia merchants, citing a set of coin ratings declared by 75 of them in the September 
16, 1742 issue of the Pennsylvania Gazette as evidence, but it is hard to conceive of such groups 
controlling the value of exchange across an entire colony. McCusker’s data on exchange rates   8
between the British pound sterling and Pennsylvania pounds in Historical Statistics (2006, Vol. 
5, series Eg318, p. 698) also indicate quite a bit of variation over time. Exchange rates could 
have fluctuated less than expected, however, if the specie stock was large enough for the public 
to deem paper as good.
 
The difficulty here is that the supply of specie appears to have been inadequate in 
Pennsylvania in the 1720s and 1730s, and perhaps throughout most of the colonial period. 
Indeed, this scarcity and the growing needs of commerce appear to have motivated the issuance 
of paper money in the first place (see Benjamin Franklin, 1729). There is an indication that the 
amount of specie in the colonies rose in the late 1740s with the end of King George’s War, but 
also that these inflows were quickly reversed. We know for certain, however, that Pennsylvania 
increased its paper money stock more than five times over between 1755 and 1760 in the midst 
of the French and Indian War. How could the commodity price index have risen by only 15 
percent in these years? Perhaps specie left the colony as the paper was issued, holding total 
money steady, but specie would have to compose about 80 percent of Pennsylvania’s money 
supply in 1755 and nearly all of it would have to exit before 1761 to accomplish this, which 
seems extraordinary. Persistent inflows of coin from 1760 through 1773 would then have been 
necessary to maintain the total stock of money as the supply of paper fell by 70 percent, while if 
anything specie flows were erratic over this period.   
Given these facts, we should consider carefully the model of Neil Wallace and Thomas J. 
Sargent (1982) as a possible explanation for the short-run stability of prices, especially after 
1754. They show that money issues, if backed by “real bills,” need not be inflationary. Building 
on this, Smith suggests that promises of colonial legislatures to accept paper money issues as 
loan and tax payments at some future date and then to destroy it effectively created an asset   9
“backing” (i.e., a receivable) along with a liability (i.e., the paper money issue), leaving the 
colony’s balance sheet unaltered.  So long as the public maintained confidence that the 
government would adhere to these plans, modest new issues need not have been inflationary. 
Given Pennsylvania’s early successes in issuing paper money, perhaps the “full faith and credit” 
of the government was something to be taken seriously by the time of the French and Indian 
War. This could have allowed the currency to retain its value until it could be reined back to 
more closely reflect the level of transactions sustainable after the war. In earlier years, such as 
1729 when the stock of paper money rose by 77 percent, the backing theory can explain why the 
paper held its value while the colony’s level of monetized transactions adjusted to it.   
In any case, the “backing” versus “fixed rates” debate seems best suited to discussions of 
short-run phenomena. The quantity theory of money with the Y properly accounted for, on the 
other hand, remains as equipped as ever to explain the long-run behavior of money and prices in 





Carter, Susan B.; Gartner, Scott Sigmund; Haines, Michael R.; Olmstead, Alan L; Sutch, 
Richard, and Wright, Gavin, eds. Historical statistics of the United States: Earliest times to 
the present. Millennial Edition. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 
Cole, Arthur Harrison. Wholesale commodity prices in the United States, 1700-1861. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1938.  
Franklin, Benjamin. A modest inquiry into the nature and necessity of a paper currency. 
Philadelphia: The New Printing Office, 1729.   10
Johansen, Soren. “Estimation and Hypothesis Testing of Cointegration Vectors in Gaussian 
Vector Autoregressive Models.”Econometrica, 1991, 59(6), pp. 1551-80. 
Lucas, Robert E., Jr. “Two Illustrations of the Quantity Theory of Money.” American Economic 
Review, 1980, 70(5), pp. 1005-14.  
McCallum, Bennett T. “Money and Prices in Colonial America: A New Test of Competing 
Theories.” Journal of Political Economy, 1992, 100(1), pp. 143-61. 
Michener, Ronald. “Fixed Exchange Rates and the Quantity Theory in Colonial America.” 
Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 1987, 27, pp. 233-308. 
Rousseau, Peter L. and Richard Sylla. “Emerging Financial Markets and Early U.S. Growth.” 
Explorations in Economic History, 2005, 42(1), pp. 1-26. 
Sargent, Thomas J. and Wallace, Neil. “The Real Bills Doctrine versus the Quantity Theory: A 
Reconsideration.” Journal of Political Economy, 1982, 90(6), pp. 1212-36. 
Smith, Bruce D. “Some Colonial Evidence on Two Theories of Money: Maryland and the 
Carolinas.” Journal of Political Economy, 1985, 93(6), pp. 1178-1211.  
Webbe, John. A discourse concerning paper money. Philadelphia: Bradford, 1743. 
West, Roger Craig. “Money in the Colonial American Economy.” Economic Inquiry, 1978, 
16(1), pp. 1-15. 